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It is traditional in experimental games to allow participants to choose only actions or possibly 
communicate intended play. In sequential two-person games, we require first movers to express 
a preference between responder choices. We find that responder behavior differs substantially 
according to whether first movers express a hope for favorable or unfavorable treatment. We find 
that such preference expression after favorable first-mover play on average increases both the 
social surplus and the lowest payoff received by 15-20%. Expressed preferences for favorable 
responder behavior by first movers who have not behaved favorably are largely ignored, 
however, and may even be counter-productive. Our results replicate earlier findings, in that 
subjects assign a high positive weight to another person’s payoffs when ahead and misbehavior 
elicits a strong negative response. Logit regressions estimate the weight placed on another 
(nonmisbehaving) person’s payoffs to be positive, even when one is behind. While the degree of 
positive reciprocity is not significant either with or without expressed preferences, there is 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Many recent experimental studies have demonstrated that willingness to sacrifice in 
games is sensitive not only to the choice set available to the player contemplating an action, but 
also to the behavior of other players that generated that choice set.
1  People are concerned not 
only with the distribution of material payoffs among players, but also with the process leading up 
to the available choices at hand.  One thing people are concerned with is the perceived intentions 
of others, meaning not just what choice another player makes, but why that choice was made.  A 
key means of inferring the “intentions” of another player is to compare the choice made to the set 
choices that player could have made but didn’t. 
However, even this may leave another player’s intentions open to interpretation, among 
other reasons because the intended consequences of that player’s actions depend not only on the 
actions but on that player’s hopes and expectations about how all players will respond to that 
action.  In most real-world social interactions, an important way people make intentions, 
preferences, and expectations clear is simple communication, via costless and non-binding 
messages.  Most experimental studies of social preferences have, however, not allowed any 
communication between the parties.
2  This “no-communication protocol” therefore misses an 
important element of many of the real-world social and economic interactions that presumably 
interest researchers studying experimental games.   
Cheap talk has, unsurprisingly, been found experimentally to be very effective in 
coordinating intended future actions in coordination games.  We explore whether a different 
form of communication, namely expressing a preference between a responder’s possible choices, 
can affect the behavior of the players in simple experimental games.  We might well expect 
expressed preferences by a first mover to affect the responder’s beliefs about the first mover’s 
hopes and motivations.   
                                                 
1 For example, see Brandts and Solà (2001), Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher (forthcoming), Charness and Rabin 
(2002), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000b). 
2 Exceptions include Brandts and Charness (forthcoming), Charness and Dufwenberg (2002), and 
Hannan, Kagel & Moser (2002).   2
We conduct experiments on a series of simple sequential games, and compare the results 
among these games and to results from similar games in Charness and Rabin (2002).  We 
compare behavior in binary-choice games in which one player is required to state a preference 
between two potential responder choices to behavior in the same games when preference 
expression is not permitted.  We use dictator games (where one player makes a unilateral 
allocation) and response games (where a first mover has an outside option or can “enter”, 
passing the choice to the responder).   
We find that differing expressed preferences lead to significantly different responses 
when the individual expressing these preferences has not acted unfavorably toward the 
responder.  When the expressing party has acted unfavorably, however, expressed preferences 
for favorable treatment generally fall on deaf ears, and may even be counter-productive.  It 
appears that people are somewhat responsive to the explicit hopes of people who have not been 
unkind to them, but don’t particularly care about disappointing selfish people.  This result is in 
line with models of utility that incorporate beliefs, but is not consistent with purely consequential 
models.  
Our results say that differences in what is expressed lead in some circumstances to 
different behavior.  We are also interested in a second question: What are the net differences 
between experiments with expressed preferences and those without?  This might provide some 
evidence, for instance, on whether experiments banning communication may be generating 
misleading general conclusions about social preferences in more realistic settings.  We address 
this question by examining the average effects of expressed preferences on social welfare from 
the alternative standpoints of the total payoffs received and the minimum payoff received.  In 
response games where entry by the first mover is favorable to the responder, there is evidence 
that expressed preferences lead to better social outcomes – in the aggregate, the expected total 
monetary payoff and the expected minimum payoff both increase by 15-20%.  However, 
expressed preferences have little overall effect in games where entry is unfavorable to the 
responder and the responder can punish the first mover; in addition, requiring expressed 
preferences in dictator games actually seems to decrease social welfare. 
We also use logit regressions on responder behavior to estimate a number of parameters, 
as in Charness and Rabin (2002).  We once again find that the desire to increase someone else’s 
payoff when he or she is behind is a key factor, and that misbehavior by the first mover is a   3
strong and significant influence on responder behavior.  We also observe that, on average, 
people prefer to increase the payoffs of other people who have not misbehaved, even when these 
others are already receiving more.  The coefficient on this parameter is significantly positive, in 
contrast to the specifications in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000a) 
distributional models.  We therefore reinforce the perspective that these models not only omit the 
role of reciprocity in explaining why players hurt others when behind; once reciprocity is 
accounted for, they have the sign wrong for how the typical subject cares about others’ payoffs 
when behind.  Omitting reciprocity, responders’ preferences when behind are not significantly 
different than self-interested.  Our regressions also confirm a major role for expressed 
preferences in explaining responder behavior.   
Models such as Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) posited both the 
positive and negative (defined as the difference in responses to another person’s favorable or 
unfavorable action perceived to be intentional vs. a “neutral” action).  Yet while abundant 
evidence of negative reciprocity has been found, few experimental studies provide any evidence 
whatsoever of positive reciprocity. 
We test again for positive reciprocity by comparing responses to an identical choice set 
generated variously by an intentional first-mover choice or by the experimenter.  We 
hypothesized that an explicit statement of preferences might make the ‘good intentions’ implicit 
in a first mover’s favorable choice sufficiently salient to induce positive reciprocity.  By 
comparing the difference between behavior in response to favorable plays and behavior in 
dictator games, we find some suggestive evidence of positive reciprocity when expressed 
preferences are involved.  This suggests that a stronger form of communication might lead to a 
greater degree of positive reciprocity.  But by conventional measures we still do not find 
statistically significant evidence of positive reciprocity, reinforcing the general finding in the 
literature.
3 
                                                 
3 We changed one other element of our previous experimental design, eliminating the feature of playing 
each game twice, with each person playing each role once, but paired with another person.  While such 
role reversal offers insight into implied beliefs and the consistency of play across roles, many observers 
have expressed the concern that this design might change people’s behavior.  We replicated many of the 
games played with role reversal in Charness and Rabin (2002), and could not find any pattern of changes 
in behavior due to role reversal.  
   4
In Section 2, we discuss some issues and evidence with respect to beliefs and social 
preferences in experimental games.  The experimental design and results are presented in Section 
3, and we analyze the effects of expressed preferences on behavior in Section 4.  We present 
some regression analysis and further discussion in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6. 
 
 
2.  Beliefs and Social Preferences 
The ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982) is the classic 
experimental example of people sacrificing money to lower the monetary payoff of another 
person.  Many responders react to (disadvantageously) lopsided proposals by rejecting those 
proposals, so that both people receive nothing rather than the lopsided allocations.  In 
distributional models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000a) 
responders reject unfair proposals because of per se aversion to disparities in relative payoffs.  
From this perspective, the intentions of proposers are irrelevant, so a fortiori responders’ beliefs 
about these intentions are irrelevant.   
However, there is abundant experimental evidence that responses are influenced by the 
options that the first player did not select and, implicitly, the responder’s view about the 
appropriateness of the choice actually made by the first player.  In games similar to ultimatum 
games, Brandts and Solà (2001) and Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (forthcoming) find substantial 
differences in both first-mover and responder behavior according to the foregone first-mover 
choice.  In many games in Charness and Rabin (2002), we varied the outside option (if any) 
available to A, while keeping the binary responder choices constant.  Here again, there are 
systematic patterns in first-mover and responder behavior that depend on the payoffs in the 
outside option.  Perceived intentions may come into play through considerations of reciprocity.  
Studies in a variety of social science disciplines suggest that reciprocity is a basic motivational 
drive in social interaction.   
There are a number of studies that demonstrate the importance of negative reciprocity.  
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) had A’s choose between (A,B,C) payoffs of (5,5,0) vs. 
(6,0,6) when they knew that B’s had previously chosen an even allocation in an earlier (and 
independent) dictator game, while C’s had chosen a selfish one. 74% of A’s chose (5,5,0),   5
presumably sacrificing to punish an unfair allocator.  Blount (1995) finds that people would 
generally accept a substantially smaller share of a sum of money when they knew the proposed 
split was generated by a random mechanism than when generated by the (self-interested) party 
with whom she would split.  Using a gift-exchange design, Charness (forthcoming) observes that 
an unfavorable allocation intentionally chosen by a self-interested person almost invariably led 
to a “no gift” response, but that many participants would contribute something to benefit a 
“blame-free” employer when they received a meager allocation chosen at random. 
There are fewer clear demonstrations of the impact of good intentions.  McCabe, Rigdon, 
and Smith (2000) find evidence of significant positive reciprocity in a simple “trust” game, and 
Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2001) observe positive reciprocity in a moonlighting game.   
Offerman (forthcoming) finds some evidence of positive reciprocity, though not to a statistically 
significant degree; Brandts and Charness (forthcoming) also find modest positive reciprocity in 
their cheap-talk game.  But there are far more studies indicating a lack of positive reciprocity.  
Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels (1998), Bolton, Brandts, and Katok (2000) find evidence against 
positive reciprocity.  In a rigorous test, Cox (2000) finds no evidence at all for positive 
reciprocity.  Based on the data in our earlier study (Charness and Rabin, forthcoming), we found 
positive reciprocity when it was free, but strong evidence against it otherwise. 
Helpful sacrifice in laboratory games can generally be explained by distributional 
considerations (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000a; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 
2002).  Standard games cited as evidence for positive reciprocity (e.g., the gift-exchange game 
and the trust game) confound altruism, equity, and reciprocity, since we do not observe 
responder choices when a favorable choice set is merely a windfall.  While a series of gift-
exchange experiments beginning with Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) show convincingly 
that people return higher effort for higher wages, the payoff structure of this game doesn’t allow 
us to distinguish between altruistic concerns and positive reciprocity.
4  The Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe (1995) investment (or trust) game is also often considered to be evidence of positive 
                                                 
4 Consider a standard design, where πEmployee = wage – effort cost and πFirm = (100 – wage)*effort, with 
wage  ∈ [0,100], effort ∈ {.1,.2,…,1.0},  and effort cost increasing in the amount of effort chosen.   
Suppose the wage is 60.  If the employee (responder) chooses the costless effort level (effort = .1), the 
(Employee, Firm) monetary payoffs would be (60,6).  By choosing an effort level of, for example, .5 
(effort cost = 6) the responder could change these to (54,30).  We might expect that many employees   6
reciprocity, although the authors are careful to frame their results in terms of trust.
5  While many 
participants return more than was sent by the first mover, dictator game evidence indicates that 
many people would choose such allocations even where the other player has made no choice.
6  If 
responses are not conditioned on the initial action, it is unclear why this should be considered to 
be positive reciprocity instead of simple generosity or altruism.  In fact, the models in Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000a), and Charness and Rabin (2002) can all explain 
these results without invoking reciprocity.   
To the extent that one’s behavior is sensitive to one’s beliefs about the intentions or 
desires of other involved parties, a number of experimental studies have shown that non-binding 
pre-play communication (“cheap talk”) can be very effective in achieving the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium outcome in coordination games.  Clearly people may treat such communication as 
carrying relevant information. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1992) find a very high 
degree of coordination with two-way communication and a smaller, but still significant and 
substantial, effectiveness for one-way communication.  Charness (2000a) finds that pre-play 
communication is very effective even when the message can clearly be self-serving.   
There are several experiments in which social preferences are clearly relevant where 
some form of anonymous communication is permitted.  Brandts and Charness (forthcoming) 
require players in one role to send a statement of intended play in a binary-choice game, where 
one choice is more favorable to the message receiver.  If an unfavorable outcome is reached in 
the subsequent simultaneous game, a receiver can punish the sender, at a cost.  They find that 
punishment is twice as likely after a deceptive signal than after a truthful one.  Charness and 
Dufwenberg (2002) show that (open-ended) promises improve the likelihood of optimal social 
choices in a principal-agent environment with hidden action, even when these choices involve 
                                                                                                                                                             
would prefer (54,30) to (60,6) even if the employer had nothing to do with the choice of the wage, in line 
with many studies showing difference-averse, altruistic, or “social-welfare” preferences. 
5 A necessary condition for their trust definition (p. 126) is that both people must be “made better off from 
the transaction compared to the outcome which would have occurred if the trustor had not entrusted the 
trustee.”  
6 Consider the case where the sender sends all 10 allocated units.  Now the responder has 40 units to 
allocate at will.  Many people playing a dictator game with 40 units to distribute would choose to allocate 
more than 10 units to the other person.  Aside from the intention behind the sender’s play, these cases are 
identical.  In addition, a test comparing the amount sent to the percentage returned gives a Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient of rs = 0.01, “[suggesting] no correlation between amounts sent and payback 
decisions” (p. 132).   7
personal financial sacrifice.  In these studies, it would appear that non-binding communication 
affects beliefs about the play or expectations of other participants.   
Closest to our design is Hannan, Kagel & Moser (2002), who conduct a gift-exchange 
experiment.  In one treatment, each firm submitted a wage offer along with a request for some 
level of costly effort; all wage/effort combinations were then displayed publicly.  Workers who 
accepted wage offers were not bound by the accompanying requests.  Requests appear to 
increase the level of effort provided, with workers often choosing an effort level intermediate 
with respect to the minimum allowed and the level requested.  We are unaware of any other 
studies in which a player can, once her move has been chosen, express a non-binding preference 
for a response.
7  Our conjecture was that a first mover’s direct statement about her preferences 
will affect a responder’s willingness to make a monetary sacrifice.  
Even when a responder should in principle be able to infer a first mover’s intentions, we 
suspect that an expressed favorable preference makes these intentions more salient; it is more 
difficult to ignore a stated preference than a belief with only implicit support.  However, even if 
we do find that expressed preferences can lead to better social outcomes, we must distinguish 
whether this result reflects positive reciprocity or some other motivation.  For example, in 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), player A chooses between an outside option of (x,0) and letting 
player B choose (y,20-y), where 0 ≤ y ≤ 20.
8  A’s were then asked to guess the average y chosen 
by B’s and, simultaneously, B’s were asked to guess the average guess of A’s.  Guesses were 
rewarded monetarily according to ex post accuracy.  While x and y were not correlated, the 
results do show a strong correlation between y and B’s expectation of A’s expectation of y; the 
authors interpret this result to mean that one is averse to “letting down” another person who has 
acted decently.  In our context, this suggests that behavior might be different if first-mover 




                                                 
7 Fehr, Klein & Schmidt (2001) allow first movers to specify response levels in a sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma game; however, this is not cheap talk. If a first mover invests in verification technology, an 
unfulfilled request automatically leads to (stochastic) punishment. 
8 There were 5 treatments, where x was variously 4, 7, 10, 13, or 16.   8
3.  Experimental Design and Results 
 
We conducted 11 sessions (with 48 distinct games) in Berkeley.  Participants played 
eight games in a session, and knew that they would be paid according to the outcome generated 
in only two of these games, randomly selected.  Recruiting at Berkeley was done primarily 
through the use of campus e-mail lists.  Each person could participate in at most one session; 
altogether there were 289 participants in the sessions.  Average earnings were around $16 in 
Berkeley, about $11 net of the show-up fee paid, for a session lasting about an hour.   
Experimental instructions are provided in Appendix A. Each of 40 simple binary-choice 
extensive-form games was played in two of Sessions 1-10. In this way, we hoped to smooth 
variation over individual sessions, and minimize strong session effects.  After observing and 
analyzing the results in the first 10 sessions, we designed eight additional games for Session 11 
chosen to fill in missing conditions whose absence diminished our ability to draw inferences 
from the original array of games.
9 We conducted no “pilot studies” prior to the experiments in 
these games except the closely-related games reported in Charness and Rabin (2002).  
We also conducted four sessions in Barcelona.  Here participants played four games in a 
session, and knew that they would be paid according to the outcome in only one game, randomly 
selected.  Recruiting in Barcelona was by posting announcements around campus. Each person 
could participate in at most one session; altogether there were 117 participants in the sessions.  
Average earnings were around $7 in Barcelona, about $4 net of the show-up fee paid for a 40-
minute session.  Each of 10 simple binary-choice extensive-form games was played in two of the 
sessions.
10  
Prior to each session, packets of instructions and decision sheets were placed face down 
on desks on both sides of a large room.  On entering, a participant could choose any unoccupied 
desk having a packet.  In all games reported here, people on opposite sides of the room were 
                                                 
9 Some games in Session 11 were designed after observing outcomes in the first 10 sessions.  The 
Barcelona sessions we designed took place after the Berkeley sessions, and were conducted to complete 
comparisons with games conducted there and reported in Charness and Rabin (2002). 
10 In both Berkeley and Barcelona, we simultaneously conducted experiments on three-player diffusion-
of-responsibility games.  These games were conducted for what was from the beginning intended as a 
different project.  They provided no confirmation of a type of diffusion of responsibility reported in the 
psychology literature.  Results in these games are available from the first author upon request, and we 
intend to report them. 
   9
randomly paired, and people were told (truthfully) that they would never be matched twice with 
the same person.  Subjects turned over the top sheet which contained the instructions, which 
were read aloud to the group.  The next sheet was turned over, presenting the first game.  Prior to 
decisions being made in the game, the outcome for every combination of choices was publicly 
described to the players.  Once these combinations were described, a coin was flipped to 
determine the role for each side of the room.  In games where two people made decisions, first-
mover choices were made and their decision sheets were collected, then second-player choices 
were made and these sheets were collected.  The experimenter received the decision sheets face 
down and put them, without inspection, in an individual folder.  We then proceeded to the next 
game, repeating this sequence (including a new coin flip).  After all games were played, an 
eight-sided die was rolled (at least) twice to determine which two of the eight games would be 
chosen for actual payments and these were calculated.  People were paid individually and 
privately.  
A responder (B) was not told prior to making his decision about the decision of the first 
mover (A).  B instead designated a contingent choice, after being told that his decision only 
affected the outcome if A opted to give the responder the choice, so that he should consider his 
choice as if A’s decision made it relevant for material payoffs.
11  We conducted games both with 
expressed preferences and without.  In the first case, A was given a choice between A1 (outside 
option), A2 with a preference for B1, and A2 with a preference for B2.  
Note that A was not allowed to remain silent. We chose this design, rather than allowing 
silence by A, to enhance the power and simplicity of our tests by limiting the number of choices. 
Clearly this is less realistic than allowing silence, and makes our results harder to interpret than 
would be ideal.  We speculate later on the possible effects of not permitting silence by A.  We 
asked responders to make choices following hypothetical A2/prefer B1 and A2/prefer B2 
selections.  In the latter case, A simply indicated A1 or A2, and B indicated B1 or B2. 
                                                 
11 We are skeptical that use of this strategy method induced dramatically different behavior than would a 
direct-response method in which players make decisions solely in response to other players’ decisions. 
See Charness and Rabin (2002) for a brief discussion on this point, and Cason and Mui (1998) and 
Brandts and Charness (2000), where this difference in elicitation methods does not appear to affect 
behavior.  Brandts and Charness (forthcoming) find that punishment levels are lower with the strategy 
method, although all qualitative results reported there hold for both the strategy and direct-response 
elicitation methods.   10
We present our analysis and interpretation of the results and parse the results in a more 
useful way in Sections 4 and 5.  But Tables 1 and 2 show all the results from this paper.  In these 
and all tables, 100 units of lab money equal $1.00 in the Berkeley sessions, and equals 100 
pesetas (worth 57 cents at the time of the experiments) in the Barcelona sessions. 
In this Table (and all other Tables in this paper), B’s alternatives are connected by a 
hyphen; the payoff pair to the left (right) of the hyphen is the result when B chooses “Left” 
(“Right”).
12  Where preference expression was mandated, we list B’s choice according to 
whether A requested “help me” vs. “don’t help me”; we also provide the results from the “no 
express” condition. 
Table 1: Games with preference expression 
  A preference  B’s helping A  
  (for B to play Left)   A hopes Left   A hopes Right 
Dictator games      
(750,375)-(400,400)   18/26 (69%)  8/26 (31%)  3/25 (12%) 
(400,400)-(0,800)  25/27 (93%)  16/27 (59%)  10/27 (37%)
(750,400)-(400,400)  16/25 (64%)  12/25 (48%)  6/25 (24%) 
(600,600)-(200,700)  19/20 (95%)  14/20 (70%)  5/20 (25%) 
(450,350)-(350,450)  15/20 (75%)  5/20 (25%)  6/20 (30%) 
    
  A play & preference  B’s helping A 
Response Games    Out  Enter, L Enter, R A hopes Left  A hopes Right
(800,0); (750,375)-(400,400)  14/25    7/25  4/25 7/24 (29%)  2/25 (8%) 
(800,0); (400,400)-(0,800)  20/26    6/26  0/26 16/26 (62%)  4/25 (16%) 
(450,0); (450,350)-(350,450)  11/25    11/25  3/25 12/24 (50%)  4/25 (16%) 
(100,1000); (125,125)-(75,125)  16/30    13/30  1/30 24/30 (80%)  14/30 (47%)
(550,550); (750,400)-(400,400)  22/30    8/30  0/30 15/28 (54%)  6/26 (23%) 
(550,550); (750,375)-(400,400)  20/27    7/27  0/27 4/27 (15%)  1/27 (4%) 
(375,1000); (400,400)-(250,350)   4/12    6/12  2/12 9/11 (82%)  11/11 (100%)
(700,1300); (800,200)-(0,0)    7/12    5/12  0/12 11/11 (100%)  11/11 (100%)
(400,1200); (400,200)-(0,0)  21/25    3/25  1/25 21/25 (84%)  19/22 (86%)
(700,200); (600,600)-(200,700)  14/20    6/20  0/20 16/20 (80%)  8/19 (42%) 
(750,0); (750,400)-(400,400)    8/20  12/20  0/20 20/20 (100%)  13/20 (65%)
(750,100); (700,500)-(300,600)  23/30    7/30  0/30 16/27 (59%)  7/27 (26%) 
(700,200); (600,600)-(200,700)  24/30    6/30  0/30 21/28 (75%)  10/28 (36%)
(450,0); (450,350)-(350,450)  20/29    9/29  0/29 14/25 (56%)  8/26 (31%) 
Barcelona games are in italics. 
                                                 
12 Throughout the remainder of the paper, we will follow the convention that the A payoff to the left of 
the hyphen is greater than the A payoff to the right of the hyphen, even though the presentation in the 
laboratory varied.   11
 
Table 2: Games without preference expression 
  A play  B’s helping A 
Dictator games     
(750,375)-(400,400)   -  13/30 (43%) 
(400,400)-(0,800) -  11/25  (44%) 
(750,400)-(375,375) -  20/26  (77%) 
(800,200)-(0,0) -  11/11  (100%) 
(750,400)-(400,400) -  17/25  (68%) 
(2000,400)-(400,400)  9/11  (82%) 
(450,350)-(350,450) - 1/20  (5%) 
(450,350)-(350,450)   - 3/29  (10%) 
    
  A’s entering   B’s helping A 
Response Games     
(800,0); (750,375)-(400,400)  9/27 (33%)  9/27 (33%) 
(800,0); (400,400)-(0,800)  11/30 (37%)  9/30 (30%) 
(800,0); (750,400)-(375,375)  12/25 (48%)  23/25 (92%) 
(450,0); (450,350)-(350,450)  11/27 (41%)  7/27 (26%) 
(0,800); (400,400)-(0,800)  11/11 (100%)  3/12 (25%) 
(550,550); (750,375)-(400,400)  3/25 (12%)  3/25 (12%) 
(550,550); (750,400)-(400,400)  5/26 (19%)  12/26 (46%) 
(100,1000); (125,125)-(75,125)  14/26 (54%)  22/26 (85%) 
(750,750); (750,400)-(375,375)  1/25 (4%)  16/25 (64%) 
(550,550); (750,400)-(375,375)  17/27 (63%)  21/27 (78%) 
(400,750); (750,400)-(375,375)  27/30 (90%)  24/30 (80%) 
(500,500); (800,200)-(0,0)  16/30 (53%)  28/30 (93%) 
(700,300); (800,200)-(0,0)  11/26 (42%)  21/26 (81%) 
(100,900); (800,200)-(0,0)  24/25 (96%)  17/25 (68%) 
(700,1300); (800,200)-(0,0)  9/25 (36%)  21/25 (84%) 
(400,1200); (400,200)-(0,0)  10/25 (40%)  21/25 (84%) 
Barcelona games are in italics. 
 
While we interpret our results in terms of the main topics of this paper in the next two 
sections, here we note that comparing the results to identical games in Charness and Rabin 
(2002) sheds light on the methodological issue of whether people behaved differently with role 
reversal in Charness and Rabin (2002) and without role reversal here.  Table B1 in Appendix B 
reports results from identical games without preference expression in the two studies, with 11 
comparisons for B play and 7 comparisons for A play.  There does not appear to be any real 
pattern of different behavior.  None of the 18 comparisons has a difference significant at the 5%   12
level (two-tailed test).  In the B case, 6 of the 11 comparisons give a two-tailed p-value above 
.50, quite consistent with the ex ante random prediction; in the A case, 6 of the 7 comparisons 
give a p-value above .50, suggesting remarkably little difference.  Overall, we see no evidence 
that people make different choices when role reversal is used in the experimental design. 
 
 
4.  Effects of Expressed Preferences. 
 
A clear overall pattern in our data is that responder behavior is quite sensitive to the first 
player’s expressed preference.  This is particularly true when A’s decision to give B a choice is 
favorable to B.  On the other hand, expressing a preference for help following selfish or hurtful 
behavior is ineffective (or even slightly counterproductive) compared to the silent game (no 
expressed preferences).   
The simplest test to whether responder play is sensitive to the expressed preference per se 
is whether A’s expression matters in a dictator game, where A has had no choice of action.  
Table 3 presents this evidence: 
 
Table 3: Dictator games and preferences 
Game  B’s helping A (by A preference) 
  No express  Help me  Don’t help me  Agg. Pref 
(750,375)-(400,400)  13/30 (43%)  8/26 (31%)  3/25 (12%)   25% 
(400,400)-(0,800)  17/27 (63%)  17/27 (63%)  11/27 (41%)  58% 
(750,400)-(400,400)  17/25 (68%)  12/25 (48%)  6/25 (24%)  39% 
(600,600)-(200,700)  16/22 (73%)*  14/20 (70%)  5/20 (25%)  68% 











The aggregated preference outcomes were calculated as follows: Multiply the proportion of those A’s 
expressing preferences for Left by the proportion of B’s then playing Left, and do the same for those A’s 
expressing preferences for Right. 
*In all tables, asterisked entries refer to data from Charness and Rabin (2002). 
 
In four of the five dictator games in Table 3, the proportion of B players who maximize 
A’s payoff is considerably higher following “Help Me” than following “Don’t Help Me”.  The 
fifth game suggests that it is not so acceptable to ask for favorable treatment when the payoffs   13
are symmetric and there is no social benefit involved – here B is actually slightly less likely to 
help A when this preference is expressed.  Nevertheless, the differences in B play are significant 
in the other four individual games at p = .05 or better; if we aggregate the data by column, the 
difference is significant at p = .00.
 13  Thus, B choices are generally sensitive to A’s expressed 
preferences, even though these are unaccompanied by any action.  However, note that A is worse 
off when forced to express preferences than when forced to be mute, with the likelihood of a 
favorable B choice reduced to 43% from 52%; this 9% difference between aggregated silence 
behavior and aggregated preference-expression behavior is marginally significant (Z = 1.34, p = 
.09, one-tailed test). 
Turning to response games, we analyze the games by category.  We first examine the 
case where A has made a favorable play – those games where (no matter how B responds) A’s 










                                                 
13 Throughout this and subsequent sections, the p-value is approximated to two decimal places and is 
calculated from the test of the equality of proportions, using the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution (see Glasnapp and Poggio, 1985), and assuming that each binary choice is independent.   
When we have an ex ante directional hypothesis, we use a one-tailed test.  Where there is no directional 
hypothesis, we use a two-tailed test.  
    It is not clear that aggregating across different games is completely appropriate.  However, we do wish 
to note that our sessions were designed so that each participant was faced with a certain “type” of game at 
most once.  Thus, for statistical purposes, each observation in our aggregated comparisons within Table 3 
and within other Tables organized by categories is largely independent.   
14 In one of the games, only one of B’s two responses lowers A’s payoff, while the other leaves A’s 
payoff the same as if A had not entered. 
15 In this Table and others, we sometimes use results from the identical games in our earlier study.  These 
games were played under the same conditions and in the same location as in the current study; the only 
difference is the role-reversal issue that is found to not make a behavioral difference.  We include these 
games to permit a larger number of comparisons, as not all pertinent games were re-run in our current 
study.   14
Table 4: Favorable A play and preferences 
B’s helping A (by A preference)  Game 
No express  Help Me  Don’t Help Me  Agg. Pref^ 
A(800,0); B(750,375)-(400,400)  9/27 (33%)  7/24 (29%)  2/25 (8%)  (21%) 
A(800,0); B(400,400)-(0,800)  9/30 (30%)  16/26 (62%)  4/25 (16%)  (62%) 
A(450,0); B(450,350)-(350,450)  7/27 (26%)  12/24 (50%)  4/25 (16%)  (43%) 
A(700,200); B(600,600)-(200,700)  25/32 (78%)*  16/20 (80%)  8/19 (42%)  (80%) 
A(450,0); B(450,350)-(350,450)  2/36 (6%)*  14/26 (54%)  8/26 (31%)  (54%) 











Barcelona games are italicized. 
^Here, and in later Tables, the aggregated preference outcomes were calculated as follows: Multiply the 
proportion of those A’s expressing preferences for Left by the proportion of B’s then playing Left, and do 
the same for those A’s expressing preferences for Right.  *indicates results from Charness and Rabin 
(2002)   
 
It is easy to see that when A has made a favorable choice, a responder is much more likely 
to help when A expresses a preference for help than when A expresses a preference for no help.  
This is true in every case, and each of the six comparisons is significant at p = .05 (one-tailed 
tests); the aggregated 33% difference is highly significant (Z = 5.75, p = .00).   
Perhaps more noteworthy is that when A has made a favorable choice, an expressed 
preference for help substantially improves the likelihood of a favorable response in comparison 
to the no-expression case.  In five of six games where A’s choice to enter is favorable to B, the 
difference is significant in the predicted direction at p = .05; if we aggregate the data, the average 
difference of 23% is highly significant (Z = 4.16, p = .00).  In addition, when we take into 
account the actual preferences expressed and compute the aggregate result, preference 
expression leads to a considerably higher likelihood of a favorable response than the silence case 
(Z = 3.79, p = .00). 
There are also six games where A’s entry is unfavorable to B.  We break these down into 




                                                                                                                                                             
   15
Table 5: Unfavorable A play and preferences 
B’s helping A (by A preference)  Games where B can help A at little 
or no cost  No express  Help Me  Don’t Help Me  Agg. Pref 
(550,550); (750,375)-(400,400)  3/25 (12%)  4/27 (15%)  1/27 (4%)  (15%) 
(100,1000); (125,125)-(75,125)  22/26 (85%)  24/30 (80%) 14/30 (47%)  (78%) 












        
B’s hurting A (by A preference)  Games where B can make a costly 
sacrifice to punish A   No express  Punish Me  Don’t Punish Me  Agg. Pref 
(700,1300); (800,200)-(0,0)  4/25 (16%)  0/11 (0%)  0/11 (0%)  (0%) 
(400,1200); (400,200)-(0,0)  4/25 (16%)  3/22 (14%)  4/25 (16%)  (15%) 











*indicates results from Charness and Rabin (2002) 
 
In the first three games, it costs B little or nothing to help A.  Here again, B is more likely 
to help when A requests help.  We are a bit surprised by this and we had no directional 
hypothesis (and so use a two-tailed test).  In any case, each of the three comparisons is 
significant at p = .10; the aggregated column responses are significantly different at p = .00.   
However, the pattern is quite different in the three games where B can choose a costly 
punishment.  Here, although the difference is not statistically significant, responders are nearly 
twice as likely to punish when A states a preference against punishment.  Perhaps the responder 
is more charitable when A appears confused, or perhaps this pattern of play stems from negative 
reciprocity.  In any case, responders do not ‘respect’ A’s preference when she has acted 
unfavorably by entering. 
We can also consider the effect of expressed preferences for unfavorable treatment.   
These results can be extracted from earlier tables, so we only present the detail in Table B3 
(Appendix B).  Here there is no consistent pattern when A acts favorably and asks for an 
unfavorable response.  The difference is significant in one direction in two of the five games, but 
is significant in the other direction in a third game.  Pooling across columns gives a difference 
with Z = 1.12, perhaps suggesting a tendency to comply with A’s expressed wishes.  The effect 
on responder choices after A acts unfavorably and asks for an unfavorable response depends on   16
whether it is costly to comply with the expressed preference.   When the responder can reduce 
A’s payoff at no cost to herself, she is significantly more likely to do so when A expresses this 
preference.  However, when reducing A’s payoff is costly, this preference actually may reduce 
the likelihood of punishment.
16  
One issue that interested us is whether preference expression produces better social 
outcomes.  We consider two proxies for social welfare: 1) the total material payoffs received, 
and 2) the minimum payoff received.  These two parameters are the fundamental components of 
the purely distributional element of the Charness and Rabin (2002) model, and have been 
identified as key social factors in studies such as Engelmann and Strobel (2002).   
  We consider three classes of games: dictator games in which sacrifice is beneficial to the 
other player, response games in which responder sacrifice is beneficial to the first mover, and 
response games in which the responder can choose to punish the first mover for an unfavorable 
entry choice.  In Table 6, efficiency is defined as the expected percentage achieved of the 
potential joint payoff sum (for all possible combinations of A and B choices), where 0% 
represents the minimum feasible payoff sum and 100% is the maximum.  The expected minimum 
is defined in terms of the actual minimum payoff as a percentage of the highest minimum payoff 







                                                 
16 We examine the effect of preference expression on A play in Table B2 of Appendix B. 
Expressing a preference has no significant effect on the likelihood of A choosing to enter either 
when entry is favorable to B or entry is unfavorable to B.  Note that, in general, A does not treat 
preference expression capriciously, as it is highly unusual (7 of 71 cases) for A to express a 
preference for less money when making an entry choice favorable to B.    17
Table 6.  Social welfare in non-punishment games: Expected efficiency and  
expected minimum payoff, expressed preferences vs. silence  
 Efficiency  Minimum   
  Pref NP NP’  Pref NP  NP’ 
Dictator games        
(750,375)-(400,400)    .250 .433 .500 .484 .567 .500 
(400,400)-(0,800)  -  -  -  .576 .440 .219 
(750,400)-(400,400) .394  .680  .692  -  -  - 
(600,600)-(200,700) .678  -  .727  .678  -  .727 
(450,350)-(350,450) -  -  -  -  -  - 
Average dictator game  .440  .576  .579  .530 
         
  Pref NP  NP’  Pref NP  NP’ 
Response Games            
(800,0); (750,375)-(400,400)  .094  .111  -  .434  .326  - 
(800,0); (400,400)-(0,800)  -  -  -  .142  .110  .174 
(450,0);  (450,350)-(350,450) .560 .407 .375 .560 .407 .375 
(700,200);  (600,600)-(200,700) .240 - .342  .240 - .342 
(750,100); (700,500)-(300,600) .152 - .030  .186 - .052 
(450,0); (450,350)-(350,450)  .310 - .306  .310 - .306 
Average response game  .271  .236  .312  .260 
Barcelona games are in italics. 
NP refers to no-preference games in our current results, and NP’ refers to no-preference 
results for the same games in the same location in our previous study. 
 
The NP and NP’ percentages are pooled for each game, and these six games are then 
averaged for the numbers in the bottom row.  We do this to facilitate comparisons between the 
preference-expression and no-preference-expression cases.  Given that the subject pool and 
location was identical and the protocols were very similar (see footnote 14), we feel justified in 
following this procedure.
17  The outcomes were calculated by multiplying the applicable 
percentage choices of A’s and B’s.   
  Preference expression actually seems to be detrimental in the dictator games, where A is 
helpless without preference expression, but has a voice with it.  Previous papers have noted a 
possible tendency for B to be more generous if A has had no choice than if A has made a choice, 
                                                 
17 There are seven direct comparisons available between NP and NP’ sessions for the same game.  In three 
of these, the measure was higher for NP.   18
even if A’s choice is favorable.
18  Here simply having a voice without an action is sufficient to 
reduce generosity.  Interestingly, this negative impact is seen primarily with respect to 
efficiency.  Asking someone to sacrifice for you to increase the total payoff is ineffective at best, 
particularly when this sacrifice would lower the minimum payoff.  However, we see that 
aggregate outcomes are improved by preference expression when A has acted favorably by 
entering.  In the aggregate, the expected efficiency and the expected minimum payoff increase 
by 15-20% with preference expression. 
What happens by this measure in punishment games?  Here preference expression is 
largely irrelevant, as is shown in Table 7: 
 
Table 7.  Social welfare in punishment games: Expected efficiency and  
expected minimum payoff , expressed preferences vs. silence  
 Efficiency  Minimum   
  Pref NP NP’  Pref NP  NP’ 
Response Games            
(100,1000);  (125,125)-(75,125) .553 .487 .518 .629 .686 .578 
(700,1300); (800,200)-(0,0)  .792  .791  -  .702  .726  - 
(550,550);  (750,400)-(400,400) .771 .781  -  .733 .808 .389 
(400,1200);  (400,200)-(0,0)  .891 .726 .846 .908 .768 .871 
(375,1000); (400,400)-(250,350) .487  --  .678  .854  -  .918 
Aggregate Average Percentage  .699  .708  .765  .739 
Barcelona games are in italics. 
NP refers to no-preference games in our current results, and NP’ refers to no-preference  
results for the same games in the same location in our previous study. 
 
  So it may well be that people are reluctant to disappoint others, but this seems to be 
mainly the case when these other people have acted cooperatively.  Giving someone a voice 
without an action actually seems to make things worse from a social standpoint. 
We next examine whether preference expression helps to induce positive reciprocity.  
Charness and Rabin (2002) replicated earlier research in finding little evidence for positive 
reciprocity without expressed preferences.  When a favorable move comes bundled with a stated 
preference for favorable treatment, will the good intentions present behind A’s entry be brought 
more into play with an expressed preference?  
                                                 
18 Charness and Rabin (2002) observe some weak evidence of such complicity effects.   Charness (2000b) 
presents evidence that people may be more generous when the responsibility for an allocation rests   19
To test for positive reciprocity, we compare B behavior after a favorable A play to B 
behavior in the dictator version of the binary choice, holding constant whether or not preference 
expression was a feature.  We consider the two cases in games where entry by A is favorable to 
B.  We first replicate the results in Charness and Rabin (2002), without expressed preferences: 
 
Table 8 – Positive Reciprocity without Expressed Preferences  
 
B’s helping A when:  Games without Expressed 




A(800,0); B(400,400)-(0,800)  9/30 (30%)  11/25 (44%)  -1.07 (.86) 
A(800,0); B(750,375)-(400,400)  9/27 (33%)  13/30 (43%)  -0.77 (.78) 
A(450,0); B(450,350)-(350,450)  7/27 (26%)  1/20 (5%)  1.89 (.03) 









Barcelona games are italicized. 
 
We see that B is slightly less likely to help A after a favorable play in three of the four 
cases, which is evidence against positive reciprocity.  If we aggregate the rows in each column 
and compare across columns, we get a difference of Z = -0.77 (p = .78, one-tailed test).   There is 
no evidence of positive reciprocity without expressed preferences. 
Turning to behavior with expressed preferences, we see a slightly different picture: 
 
Table 9 –Positive Reciprocity with Expressed Preferences 
 
B’s helping A  Entering is a favorable play and 
A prefers a favorable response   Preference case  Dictator version 
Z (one-tailed 
p-value) 
(800,0); (400,400)-(0,800)  16/26 (62%)  16/27 (59%)  0.17 (.43) 
(800,0); (750,375)-(400,400)  7/24 (29%)  8/26 (31%)  -0.12 (.55) 
(450,0); (450,350)-(350,450)  12/24 (50%)  5/20 (25%)  1.70 (.04) 









                                                                                                                                                             
entirely on one’s shoulders than when one can rationalize that someone else shares the responsibility.   20
Overall, there appears to be some tendency for positive reciprocity per se to be triggered 
by a stated preference for favorable treatment.  This is not statistically significant; nevertheless, 
it appears that expressing a preference for a favorable play is beneficial, when we consider the 
13% difference in the difference across columns in the aggregated data in Tables 8 and 9.  The 
test of proportions finds this difference to be statistically significant (Z = 2.02, p = .02).   
Expressed preferences do appear to make good intentions salient to some degree, although the 
bulk of the improvement in B behavior would appear to stem from an unwillingness to go 
against the hopes (or expectations) of someone who has not misbehaved. 
 
 
5.  Regression Analysis and Discussion 
We turn now to an approach to summarizing our data that assumes that all subjects share 
a fixed set of preferences, and that observed behavior corresponds to individuals implementing 
those preferences with error.  The likelihood of error is assumed to be a decreasing function of 
the utility cost of an error.  We use the simple conceptual model of social preferences in two-
person games presented in Charness and Rabin (2002).  Letting πA and πB be Player A’s and B’s 
money payoffs, consider the following formulation of Player B’s preferences:   
 
UB(πA,πB) ≡ (ρ⋅r + σ⋅s + θ⋅q)⋅πA + (1 - ρ⋅r - σ⋅s - θ⋅q)⋅πB, 
 
where    r = 1 if πB > πA, and r = 0 otherwise; 
s = 1 if πB < πA, and s = 0 otherwise; 
q = -1 if A has misbehaved, and q = 0 otherwise.   
 
This formulation says that B’s utility is a weighted sum of her own material payoff and A’s 
payoff, where the weight B places on A’s payoff may depend on whether A is getting a higher or 
lower payoff than B and on whether A has behaved unfairly.
19  The parameters ρ, σ, and θ 
capture various aspects of social preferences.  The parameter θ provides a mechanism for 
modeling reciprocity.  The parameters ρ and σ allow for a range of different “distributional 
preferences”, that rely solely on the outcomes and not on any notion of reciprocity.    21
We estimate the population means for ρ and σ, the respective weight one assigns to the 
material payoff of the other player when this payoff is less than or greater than one’s own, and  
θ, the weight one assigns to reciprocating, by performing maximum-likelihood estimation on our 






γ ⋅u(action2)  
determines the values that best match predicted probabilities of play with the observed 
behavior.
















                                                                                                                                                             
19. Another way of writing this utility function that some readers might find more intuitive is to break it 
down into two cases: When πB ≥ πA, UB(πA,πB) ≡ (1-ρ-θq)πB + (ρ+θq)πA; when πB ≤ πA, UB(πA,πB) ≡ (1-
σ-θq)πB + (σ+θq)πA. 
20 The precision parameter γ reflects sensitivity to differences in utility, where the higher the value of γ, 
the sharper the predictions.  When γ is 0, the probability of either action must be 50 percent; when γ is 
arbitrarily large, the probability of the action yielding the highest utility approaches 1.  This approach 
assumes that all subjects share a fixed set of preferences, and that observed behavior corresponds to 
individuals implementing those preferences with error.  The likelihood of error is assumed to be a 
decreasing function of the utility cost of an error. 
21 We also tried specifications including a dummy variable for whether player B has a unilateral choice of 
allocations.  However, the estimated coefficient on this dummy is tiny, and we omit these specifications.  
This provides no overall support for the conjectured complicity effects mentioned above.   22
Table 10.  Regression estimates for B behavior (N=1491) 
 
Model Restrictions ρ  σ  θ  HN HM  γ  LL 
           
Self-interest  ρ = σ = θ =  
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t-statistics are in parentheses. HN ≡ Hope Nice, HM ≡ Hope Mean, γ is the precision parameter, and LL is 
the log-likelihood function.  
 
  In all the regressions, ρ is estimated to be around .4 and is always highly significant. σ is 
always small, ranging from -.01 to .06.  In the regression at the bottom of the chart, it is actually 
significantly positive.  We see a large and highly significant negative coefficient on the dummy 
for Hope Mean, and a smaller and marginally significant positive one for the Hope Nice dummy. 
  The most rigorous test for determining the significance of each parameter is to restrict 
that parameter to a value of zero in the otherwise complete and unrestricted regression.  Doing 
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Table 11.  Likelihood-ratio tests on parameter restrictions, B behavior (N=1491) 
 
Restriction LL χ
2  p-value 
      
None 
 
-882.853 -  - 
Hope Nice = 0  -884.460  3.21  .08 
 




θ =  0  -888.857 12.0 .00 
 
Hope Mean = 0  -911.427  57.1  .00 
 
ρ = 0  -942.272 118.8 
 
.00 
LL is the log-likelihood function. 
 
  The strongest explanatory power for behavior comes from ρ, so that the most important 
non-selfish motive is a player’s desire when ahead to increase the other player’s payoff.  The 
next most powerful factor is that of an expressed preference for unfavorable treatment.  We also 
see that A’s misbehavior is a very significant factor.  The significantly positive baseline level for 
σ suggested in Table 10 is confirmed by this test.  An expressed preference for favorable 
treatment is marginally significant.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Behavior by responders in our simple games is quite sensitive to the preference expressed 
by a first mover who has not misbehaved.  The greatest effects observed result from the 
clarification of intentions behind a favorable play.  Responders are much more likely to help first 
movers after a favorable play when there has been a preference expressed for help than when no 
such preference can be indicated.  Expressed preferences by A affect B’s behavior even when A 
has made no play, so to some extent the responder is simply complying with the first mover’s 
stated hope.    24
There is no role for these effects in either standard theory or in current prominent models 
of social motivation.  It is obvious that the consequentialist models of pure distribution ignore 
expressed preferences, as nothing occurring before the responder’s choice between outcomes is 
relevant to the choice.  The Falk and Fischbacher (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002) models 
combine reciprocity preferences with distributional preferences, but in these models a player’s 
intentions are discerned by comparing the action chosen with the feasible outcome space, 
without regard for the player’s stated preferences. 
There are social benefits to expressed preferences, when a favorable action is 
accompanied by a hope for favorable treatment.  Using two different measures of social welfare, 
we find that optimal outcomes are achieved substantially more frequently in this case.  On the 
other hand, social welfare in punishment games is unaffected by preference expression, and 
social welfare in dictator games seems to be adversely affected.   
On this last point, perhaps people consider it to be inappropriate to express a preference 
for financial sacrifice on one’s behalf when one has not taken an action.  In fact, there is a 
significantly greater likelihood that A’s express a preference for unfavorable treatment in 
dictator games than in games where entry by A is unfavorable to B (21% compared to 10%, Z = 
2.01, p = .04).  In the dictator-game comparisons in Table 3, we see that, in the aggregate, B’s 
are more likely to help A’s when no preference can be expressed than when a preference for 
favorable treatment is expressed.  This leads us to speculate on the outcomes that would occur if 
participants in the preference games were also given the option of not expressing a preference.   
Our suspicion is that would not have changed behavior much in games with favorable entry, but 
that a substantial proportion of A’s would have chosen to stay mute in dictator games and 
punishment games if they had been given this option. 
We do not observe substantial positive reciprocity per se for a favorable first-mover play 
either without preference expression or when it is accompanied by a preference for a favorable 
response.  However, there is significant movement in this direction, as seen by comparing Table 
8 and 9.  We feel it is quite possible that a more personal form of communication might well 
induce a greater degree of positive reciprocity.  Nevertheless, the primary source of the benefits 
found seem to stem from the preference expression itself, rather than from any increased salience 
of the favorable move made by player A.  Perhaps some of the effect stems from a reluctance to   25
disappoint the first mover, as seems to be the case in the evidence from expressed preferences in 
dictator games.  
Communication is often an important element in real-world social interactions.   
Experimental designs disallowing communication are thereby neglecting a key issue.  While 
experimenters should surely maintain careful control over the communication protocol, 
gathering more data from high-communication experiments seems potentially very fruitful.     26
Appendix A: Sample Instructions (Barcelona) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment.  You will receive 400 pesetas for your 
participation, in addition to other money to be paid as a result of decisions made in the 
experiment. 
 
You will be involved in 4 situations where decisions are made.  You will make binary decisions 
in most or all of these situations.  Each decision (and outcome) is independent from each of your 
other decisions, so that your decisions and outcomes in one situation will not affect your 
outcomes in any other situation.   
 
In every case, you will be anonymously paired with one (or more) other people, so that your 
decision may affect the outcomes of others, just as the decisions of the other people in your 
group may affect your outcomes.   For every decision task, you will be paired with a different 
person or persons than in previous decisions.  
 
There are A and B “roles” in each situation.  Every person will receive the decision forms for 
each role in each situation.  These sheets are color-coded by role.  Please read each one (for each 
situation in turn; we will proceed one at a time) and ask question(s) if you wish a further 
explanation.  When everyone has become familiarized with these, we will flip a coin to 
determine the role for each participant. 
 
If a situation has multiple decisions (some situations only have decisions for one role), these 
decisions will be made sequentially, in alphabetical order: “A” persons will complete their 
decision sheets first and their decision sheets will then be collected.  Next, “B” persons complete 
their decision sheets and these will be collected.   
 
When you have made a decision, please turn your decision sheet over, so that we will know 
when people have finished.   
 
You will not be informed of the results of any previous decisions prior to making subsequent 
decisions.    
 
Although there will be a total of 4 outcomes, only 1 of these outcomes will be selected for 
determining monetary reward.  A die will be rolled at the end of the experiment for this purpose. 
 
At the end of the session, you will be given a receipt form to be filled out and you will be paid 
individually and privately.  
 
Please feel free to ask questions at any point if you feel you need clarification.  Please do so by 
raising your hand.  Please DO NOT attempt to communicate with any other participants in the 
session until the session is concluded. 
 
We will proceed to the decisions once the instructions are clear.  Are there any questions?   27
DECISION 1 
 
You are person A. 
 
You may choose A1 or A2.  If you choose A1, you would receive 750 and person B would 
receive 100.  If you choose A2, then B’s choice of B1 or B2 would determine the outcome.  If 
you choose A2 and B chooses B1, you would receive 700 and B would receive 500.  If you 
choose A2 and person B chooses B2, you would receive 300 and he or she would receive 600.  
Person B knows that his or her choice only affects the outcome if you choose A2, so that he 
or she will choose B1 or B2 on the assumption that you have chosen A2 over A1.  Please 
mark a choice below.  Person B will make a decision contingent on your decision/preference.  
 
 
      A 
      / \  
                    /   \ 
          A1    /      \   A2 
                 /         \ 
                /           \ 
                  A 750          \ 
                  B 100              \              
                     \ 
           B 
           / \  
                        /   \ 
             B1     /      \    B2 
                     /         \ 
                    /            \ 
            A  700          300  A 








I choose A1       ______ 
 
I choose A2 with the hope that B selects B1,  
because I prefer the outcome (700,500) to (750,100) ______ 
 
I choose A2 with the hope that B selects B2,  
because I prefer the outcome (300,600) to (750,100) ______   28
DECISION 1 
 
You are person B. 
 
You may choose B1 or B2.  Person A has already made a choice.  If he or she has chosen A1, he 
or she would receive 750 and you would receive 100.  Your decision only affects the outcome 
if person A has chosen A2.  Thus, you should choose B1 or B2 on the assumption that A has 
chosen A2 over A1.   If A has chosen A2 and you choose B1, you would receive 500 and A 
would receive 700.  If person A has chosen A2 and you choose B2, then you would receive 600 
and person A would receive 300. 
 
 
      A 
      / \  
                    /   \ 
          A1    /      \   A2 
                 /         \ 
                /            \ 
                  A 750           \ 
                  B 100               \              
      \  
           B 
           / \  
                        /   \ 
             B1     /      \    B2 
                     /         \ 
                    /            \ 
            A  700          300  A 




If person A has chosen A2, he or she has made one of two possible comments.  Please indicate 




(mark one in each row) 
 
1) If A has stated “I choose A2 with the hope that B selects B1,  
because I prefer the outcome (700,500) to (750,100),” I choose:  B1   B2 
 
2) If A has stated “I choose A2 with the hope that B selects B2,  
because I prefer the outcome (300,600) to (750,100),” I choose:  B1   B2 
   29
DECISION 2 
 
You are person A. 
 
You have no choice in this situation.   Person B’s choice determines the outcome.  If person B 
chooses 1, you would receive 450 and person B would receive 350.  If person B chooses 2, you 





            B 
           / \  
         /       \  
       /           \  
                       /        \ 
             B1    /           \  B2 
                     /             \ 
                    /                \ 
                   /                   \ 
            A  450                 350  A 










    I understand I have no choice in this situation  ______ 




You are person B. 
 
You may choose B1 or B2.  Person A has no choice in this situation.  If you choose B1, you 
would receive 350 and person A would receive 450.  If you choose B2, you would receive 450 
and person A would receive 350. 
 
 
         B 
           / \  
         /       \  
       /           \  
                       /        \ 
             B1    /           \  B2 
                     /             \ 
                    /                \ 
                   /                   \ 
            A  450                 350  A 













    I choose:         B1      B2 
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Appendix B – Further Detail 
 
Table B1 – The Effect of Role Reversal  
 
B’s helping A  B play 




B (750,375)-(400,400)  16/32 (50%)  13/30 (43%)  0.53 (.60) 
B (750,400)-(400,400)  18/26 (69%)  17/25 (68%)  0.09 (.93) 
B (800,200)-(0,0)  36/36 (100%)  11/11 (100%)  0.00 (1.00) 
B (400,400)-(0,800)  7/32 (22%)  11/25 (44%)  -1.78 (.07) 
(100,1000); (125,125)-(75,125) 21/32 (66%)  22/26 (85%)  -1.64 (.10) 
(450,0); (450,350)-(350,450)  6/32 (19%)  7/27 (26%)  -0.66 (.51) 
(800,0); (400,400)-(0,800)  12/22 (55%)  9/30 (30%)  1.78 (.07) 
(550,550); (750,375)-(400,400) 4/22 (18%)  3/25 (12%)  0.48 (.63) 
(0,800); (400,400)-(0,800)  18/32 (56%)  3/12 (25%)  1.85 (.06) 
(500,500); (800,200)-(0,0)  29/32 (91%)  28/30 (93%)  -0.39 (.70) 









      
A’s entering   A play 




(100,1000); (125,125)-(75,125) 16/32 (50%)  14/26 (54%)  -0.29 (.77) 
(450,0); (450,350)-(350,450)  12/32 (38%)  11/27 (41%)  -0.25 (.80) 
(800,0); (400,400)-(0,800)  7/22 (32%)  11/30 (37%)  -0.36 (.72) 
(550,550); (750,375)-(400,400) 3/22 (14%)  2/25 (8%)  0.62 (.54) 
(0,800); (400,400)-(0,800)  32/32 (100%)  11/11 (100%)  0.00 (1.00) 
(500,500); (800,200)-(0,0)  19/32 (59%)  16/30 (53%)  0.48 (.63) 
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Table B2 – The Effect of Expressing a Preference on A Play  
 
A’s entering   Games where entering is a 
favorable play   Preference Silence 
Z (one-tailed 
p-value) 
(450,0); (450,350)-(350,450)  14/25 (56%)  11/27 (41%)  1.10 (.14) 
(800,0); (400,400)-(0,800)  6/26 (23%)  11/30 (37%)  -1.10 (.86) 
(800,0); (750,375)-(400,400)  11/25 (44%)  9/27 (33%)  0.79 (.21) 
A(700,200); B(600,600)-(200,700)  6/20 (30%)  14/32 (44%)*  -0.99 (.84) 
A(450,0); B(450,350)-(350,450)  9/29 (31%)  11/36 (31%)  0.04 (.02) 
A(750,100); B(700,500)-(300,600)  7/30 (23%)  3/36 (8%)  1.69 (.05) 
 







      
      
A’s entering   Games where entering is an 
unfavorable play   Preference Silence 
Z (two-tailed 
p-value) 
(550,550); (750,375)-(400,400)  7/27 (26%)  3/25 (12%)  1.27 (.20) 
(100,1000); (125,125)-(75,125)  14/30 (47%)  14/26 (54%)  -0.54 (.59) 
(550,550); (750,400)-(400,400)  8/30 (27%)  5/26 (19%)  0.66 (.51) 
(700,1300); (800,200)-(0,0)  5/12 (42%)  9/25 (36%)  0.33 (.74) 
(400,1200); (400,200)-(0,0)  4/25 (16%)  10/25 (40%)  -1.89 (.06) 
 







Barcelona games are italicized.  
*Indicates results from Charness and Rabin (2002) 
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Table B3 – The Effect of Unfavorable Expressed Preferences on Responder Play  
 
B’s helping A (by A preference)  A has made a favorable play  
Don’t Help Me  No Preference 
Z (two-tailed 
p-value) 
(450,0); (450,350)-(350,450)  4/25 (16%)  7/27 (26%)  0.88 (.38) 
(800,0); (400,400)-(0,800)  2/25 (8%)  9/30 (30%)  2.03 (.04) 
(800,0); (750,375)-(400,400)  3/25 (12%)  9/27 (33%)  1.82 (.06) 
A(450,0); B(450,350)-(350,450)  7/27 (26%)  2/36 (6%)  -2.29 (.02) 









      
B’s hurting A (by A preference)  A has made an unfavorable play, 
B can punish at no cost  Punish Me  No Preference 
Z (one-tailed 
p-value) 
(550,550); (750,375)-(400,400)  26/27 (96%)  22/25 (88%)  1.12 (.13) 
(100,1000); (125,125)-(75,125)  16/30 (53%)  4/26 (15%)  2.96 (.00) 









      
B’s helping A (by A preference)  A has made an unfavorable play, 
B must pay to punish  Punish Me  No Preference 
Z (one-tailed 
p-value)* 
(700,1300); (800,200)-(0,0)  0/11 (0%)  4/25 (16%)  1.41 (.08) 
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